Black carbon from heavy fuel oils is a major polluter

Black carbon emissions from international shipping north of 60°N must be regulated in order to cut the pollutant’s impact on Arctic snow and ice, say the Clean Arctic Alliance(CAA), a group of 20 environmental organizations concerned with Arctic environmental issues.

Black carbon – also known as soot – is a potent climate-forcing pollutant possibly second only to CO2 and with a climate impact over 3,000 times that of CO2. Emitted by exhausts of ships burning heavy fuel oils, its black particles are deposited on snow and ice and accelerate melting by way of the albedo effect. This creates a feedback loop that further exacerbates local and global warming. In a report published in December 2017, the International Council for Clean Transportation say:

We found that ships emitted an estimated 67 thousand tonnes of black carbon in 2015, representing more than 20% of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions from ships on a 20-year timescale, making black carbon an important contributor to the sector’s climate warming impacts. Container ships emitted the most black carbon, accounting for 26% of emissions. However, cruise ships accounted for a disproportionately large amount of black carbon and emitted an average of 10 tonnes of black carbon per ship in 2015, almost three times as much as the average container ship.

https://theicct.org/publication/black-carbon-emissions-and-fuel-use-in-global-shipping-2015/

The effect of black carbon is worse in the Arctic, partly because of the albedo effect.

In the lead-up to a meeting of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Dr Sian Prior, Lead Advisor to the Clean Arctic Alliance, said:

Reducing the impact of black carbon on Arctic snow and ice would have a rapid and dramatic reduction in the impact of shipping emissions on the planet’s climate – this is why action in the shipping sector to reduce black carbon emissions can and should start immediately, by simply switching to cleaner fuels and installing particulate filters…The IMO can regulate and reduce black carbon emissions by amending MARPOL Annex VI to require ships operating in and near to the Arctic (north of 60 degrees North) to use distillate or other alternative cleaner fuels.

https://cleanarctic.org/2022/12/12/mepc-79-slashing-black-carbon-emissions-would-cut-shippings-climate-impact-this-decade/

The Arctic is warming at a rate three to four times faster than the global average, due to a phenomenon known as Arctic amplification. The use of heavy fuel oils that emit black carbon probably isn’t helping.

Staggering use of chemicals in textiles

The textile industry is horrendous. A new report has just been published by the Nordic Council of Ministers on chemicals in textiles. Over the last 15 years, the textile industry has doubled and is expected to increase further.

Here is an excerpt of the stages involved in making textiles.

A typical textile garment production chain covers textile fibres which are grown or manufactured in one country and then shipped to another country for spinning before the yarn is shipped to a third country for knitting or weaving. The fabric is thereafter sent to another location or country for colouring, processing and finally the sewing of the final garment. When it comes to the chemical content of the final products, the complexity is increased due to products containing materials and chemicals from different suppliers with different legislative requirements^[10]

https://pub.norden.org/temanord2022-549/#111148

To some extent, the number of chemicals used depends on the fabric being produced and the processes used, e.g. whether flame retardants are added or whether wet printing is involved. Chemical use is staggering:

Each year in textile production it is estimated that 43 million tonnes of chemicals are used, covering more than 8000 different chemicals^[11]. The textile production is chemical-intensive as between 1.5–6.9 kg chemicals are used to produce 1 kg new textile.

https://pub.norden.org/temanord2022-549/#111148

Think about that.

The report itself covers the different types of chemical information exchange systems that are currently being used in the textile supply chain and goes into detail about indicators that can be used to track chemical information. So, for the general reader, that part of the report is less interesting.

Nevertheless, it DOES cover problems associated with the use of recycled fibres, saying that the chemicals used in the original product are not known and the use of recycled wool has turned out to be more problematic than recycled cotton and polyester. Less than 1% of material used in the textile industry is recycled and used in new clothing.

The environmental effects of textiles have received more attention over the last 10 years or so, from land and water use to pesticides to river pollution from dyes used in textile manufacture. And deservedly so.

I’ll definitely be washing new clothes before wearing them from now on.

Fluoride levels high near aluminium smelter in West Iceland

Levels of gaseous hydrogen fluoride have never been higher in the vicinity of the Century aluminium smelter, Elkem ferrosilicon smelter and an aluminium recycling company, Alur Aluminium Processing which takes aluminium dross from the Century smelter and recycles it. The latest environmental monitoring report carried out by engineering company EFLA for the three companies shows that levels of both gaseous hydrogen fluoride and particulate fluoride had doubled between 2020 and 2021 at a monitoring station near the plants.

These three companies are located in the same industrial area, Grundartangi in West Iceland.

According to the monitoring report (in Icelandic), levels of trapped fluorides and sulphates in precipitation were also very high in two rivers near the smelter area, compared to previous years, and have never been recorded at higher levels since monitoring began. Along the same lines, acidity (pH) of all the rivers tested had never measured lower.

Levels of sulphur dioxide and hydrogen sulphide were also some of the highest recorded, although under environmental limits.

The results for fluoride in grass showed increases in all monitoring stations, with the exception of one which was within the dilution area. In some areas, these were record highs. Fluoride levels in leaves showed a similar trend.

Fluoride in jaw bones of adult sheep also measured record highs. In five cases, fluoride levels exceeded those considered at risk of causing tooth damage in deer according to Norwegian research, and in one case exceeded levels considered to cause tooth damage in deer (2,000 μg F/g).

Fluoride accumulates in animals as they grow older so it is particularly alarming that at one monitoring station, the mean concentration of fluoride in lamb jaw bones was over the level considered to cause damage to teeth in deer.

Why deer, you may ask? Because there are no results for sheep or horses. It’s as simple as that.

I wrote an article for Al Jazeera in 2014 on fluoride pollution from an aluminium smelter in East Iceland and also blogged an update here. The latest monitoring report doesn’t show adverse effects for horses, though, apart from a degree of tooth damage in one horse.

Glass bottles not recycled in Iceland

It’s disgraceful. Apparently Iceland is the only European country that does not recycle glass bottles.

Well, in theory it does. At least, Icelanders get refunded when depositing glass bottles at the recycling company Endurvinnslan.

But in practice, the company says it is not financially sound to recycle the bottles – despite several recent reports that say the opposite – and instead the bottles are crushed on site and, according to the investigative newspaper Stundin, they are taken by truck to a site called Bolalda, not far from Reykjavik and also not far from the protected water catchment area for the capital.

Bolalda is the site of an old mine and is located on public land. The original idea was to set inert recyclable material such as gravel and soil on the site, in an attempt to restore the area to its original condition. But in addition, shredded glass is dumped there by trucks.

The company collects about 5,000 tonnes of glass bottles annually, all of which ends up at Bolalda. And every day, up to 300 truckloads of waste arrive at the site. Although the sole worker at the site turns away trucks that are clearly not carrying inert materials, glass is often hidden from view. If perchance a driver is caught, there’s no fine and no aftermath – the truck driver just takes it to the main landfill site instead, where a fee has to be paid for depositing the glass.

The EU set a goal in 2001 whereby 15% of glass should be recycled, then in 2012 the target was raised to 60% and to 75% by 2030. The average for the EEA and EU countries is currently 78% – but in Iceland it’s zero.

Equilibrium in silicon metal smelters can take 2-4 years

Before the PCC silicon metal smelter began operation at Bakki, near Husavik in North Iceland, Kristjan Thor Magnusson, head of the pertinent local authority, said that he had been told that “it could take 2-4 years to achieve equilibrium in the operation of silicon metal smelters”.

The Bakki smelter suffered numerous problems initially, both technically and financially, and even closed for nine months in 2020 as a result. Admittedly the situation has changed for the better since it reopened, but Magnusson says that “now and then” residents of the nearby community of Husavik (pop. 2,400) complained about odour and smoke before it was closed temporarily.

The owners of the Bakki plant, PCC SE, recently signed a letter of intent with Arion bank, saying they were interested in buying the now defunct silicon metal plant, once owned by United Silicon, at Helguvik, southwest Iceland. The bank has been trying to sell the Helguvik smelter since Iceland’s Environment Agency closed down the smelter in 2017 after numerous complaints from local residents (population of the nearest town is approx. 20,000), but up till now no one has been seriously interested.

The interest of PCC in buying and operating the Helguvik plant has aroused huge opposition of the local council and local residents.

Fridjon Einarsson, leader of the Reykjanesbaer council, points out that over the last 30 years, the Helguvik site has supposed to be the site of a factory producing steel grating, then an aluminium smelter, and then two silicon metal smelters. The only one of these that came to fruition was one of the silicon metal smelters, and “our experience of this was terrifying“, he told a journalist from the Icelandic media Kjarninn. The council lost ISK 10 billion ($79 million) as a result of these endeavours.

All eleven councillors are against the plant reopening, so even if the makeup of the council changes after the next elections in May, it is unlikely that their stance would change significantly.

For their part, Arion bank says that they are considering three options: selling the disused smelter to another company that will operate a silicon metal plant there; deconstructing the smelter; and using the existing facilities for a different kind of operation. But in reality, they say that only the first option is feasible.

But IF the smelter starts functioning again as a silicon metal smelter and IF it generally takes 2-4 years for a smelter to start running smoothly, that is a long time for residents to have to put up with odours, pollution and the like.

And the population of Reykjanesbaer is nine times bigger than that of Husavik.

Iceland’s Planning Agency gives cautious approval to EIA for revamped silicon metal smelter

It doesn’t make sense. At a time when Iceland has said it will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 relative to 2005, Iceland’s Planning Agency (PA) has given its opinion on an environmental impact assessment that will permit the operation of a silicon metal plant at Helguvik in southwest Iceland – yes, the one that Iceland’s Environment Agency closed down in September 2017 because of constant technical problems that resulted in intermittent use, furious neighbours, unexplained odour pollution and health problems, not to mention fires.

The PA say that new modifications should mean that nearby residents will experience odour less frequently and less intensely than when the smelter was previously operating under United Silicon, as emissions will be released through a 52-m high chimney instead of through a filter shaft. The odour has been attributed to a VOC (volatile organic compound) though it is not known which one.

Stakksberg, which was primed by Arion Bank to sell the smelter after it was closed down and was responsible for carrying out the EIA, say that if local residents notify the presence of an odour, they will measure the level of VOCs near the plant. However, given the previous problems with the smelter, the PA recommend that an operating licence should only be given for the first stage of the operation, with one light arc furnace operating, until experience has been gained of the design modifications.

If the revamping of the smelter proves successful, the PA envisage “some environmental impact” in the first stage but “considerable environmental impact” in the final stage.

The smelter is expected to use 155,000 tonnes of coal a year in the first stage of the operation, but if four furnaces operate the figure will increase to 400,000 tones of coal annually.

The PA anticipate a lot of opposition from local residents if operation of the smelter resumes, and they are not mistaken in this regard as ASH, the group opposed to heavy industry in the area has encouraged residents to comment on the EIA of the proposed smelter.

The local council is also opposed to reopening of the plant, due to past experience and local opposition.

Nevertheless, nothing will happen until a buyer is found for the smelter. Though Stakksberg has sometimes said that there are a number of buyers interested in the smelter, nothing has happened so far. Besides having to deal with angry residents and a council opposed to the plant, a prospective buyer will have to bet on the new design proving successful.

Stakksberg can now apply for building permission needed for the necessary improvements.

The silicon plant’s emissions will fall under the EU’s Emission Trading System, so technically the 11% of Iceland’s total 2019 emissions that could be produced by the plant it it ever gets to the “fully functioning” stage, with four furnaces, will not affect Iceland’s proposed “reductions in greenhouse gases” that it has to account for to the EU.

A good overview has been provided here. Though in Icelandic, Google translate could provide some idea at least of the issues.

Update, 13 January: PCC SE, owners of the PCC Bakki silicon metal smelter in north Iceland, are apparently interested in buying the Helguvik smelter. The local council have told PCC it would be a definitive NO on their part.

Climate effects of militarism must be discussed at COP26

Achieving results at COP26 in Glasgow is essential if future temperature rise is to be limited to 1.5°C. Undoubtedly many issues will be discussed, though some will probably receive little or no attention.

One of these is likely to be the effect of militarism on the environment. When I was doing my Masters in environmental impact assessment, I criticized the lack of EIAs for military actions. During the Gulf War, 700 oil wells were blown up, burning 6 million barrels of oil a day for nearly 10 months, according to the Conflict and Environment Observatory(CEOBS). Huge environmental damage resulted. But I doubt very much that environmental costs were discussed prior to the oil explosions.

In June this year, CEOBS published another article on the climate costs of military activities. It says for instance:

Overall, aviation represents around 3.5% of climate warming, and the role of military aviation is currently estimated at between 8% to 15% of this total. The contribution from military aircraft is difficult to estimate and likely accounts for the single largest source of uncertainty in global aviation – the primary difficulty arises from the nondisclosure of data on military aviation activity, which underlines the importance of transparent reporting.

Because of the use of more polluting ‘bunker’ fuel, the marine sector is responsible for 2.5% of global GHG emissions and rising.

The military’s contribution to climate change. Linsey Cottrell and Eoghan Darbyshire, June 16, 2021.

Set up in 2018 as successor to the Toxic Remnants of War Project, CEOPS seem to have produced a number of interesting documents on militarism and the environment. They have also sent out a call to get military emissions discussed at COP26, pointing out that the 2015 Paris Agreement left cutting military greenhouse gas emissions to the discretion of individual countries.

The call points out that:

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change obliges signatories to publish annual GHG emissions, but military emissions reporting is voluntary and often not included. When reported, it is generally incomplete and excludes emissions from equipment and supply chains, and those related to the impact of conflict-operations. This can include emissions from infrastructure damage, conflict-linked environmental change and post-conflict reconstruction. 

https://ceobs.org/governments-must-commit-to-military-emissions-cuts-at-cop26/

They say that countries must make commitments in various areas, one of which is “Commit to incorporating climate and environmental assessments in decision-making for all procurement, activities and missions” and another is “Highlight the relationship between climate change and environmental degradation, and demonstrate a commitment to reducing the overall environmental impact of all military activities and missions”.

Almost 200 organizations have signed so far, as well as individuals. Although I signed it as an individual, I would prefer a world without any military. And I know that some peace groups are facing a dilemma over whether signing implies an endorsement of war and militarism.

High fluoride levels from East Iceland aluminium smelter in 2021 reputably arose from hot, dry weather

Seven years ago, I wrote an article for Al Jazeera on high fluoride levels in East Iceland that were due to Alcoa’s Fjardaal aluminium smelter. I also blogged about it here, with new information that had come to light since I filed the original article. Scientists from Iceland’s Environment Agency found that the concentration of hydrogen fluoride in grass grazed by sheep near the village of Reydarfjordur, where the smelter is located, exceeded the recommended limits.

Now, high fluoride levels have once again been recorded in grass near Reydarfjordur. Milking ruminants are most susceptible to fluoride as fluoride can get into the milk and young animals can be exposed to it when sucking on their mother’s udders. Cow’s milk can also become unfit for processing or drinking.

According to EU legislation, fluoride in ruminants must not exceed 30 mg/kg in hay, based on a content of 88% dry matter. Many samples taken by the East Iceland Nature Research Centre during the summer revealed much higher levels. However, these results are provisional and samples have to repeated using acknowledged methods, according to the Food and Veterinary Authority (MAST).

There are not many farms in the area. Levels are just under the limit at the only sheep farm in the area, but one farm that sends hay to the Faroe Islands has too much fluoride in its hay. Two other farms also have levels exceeding the maximum, but according to the RÚV article (in Icelandic), those farms only make hay for horses and MAST says that horses can tolerate considerable amounts of fluoride in hay.

Whether or not fluoride is toxic to horses when grazing is questionable, according to the article I wrote for Al Jazeera. In 2016, veterinarian Sigurdur Sigurdarson and university toxicologist Jakob Kristinsson published a report (in Icelandic) saying that the sick horses mentioned in my Al Jazeera article that were living near the Century aluminium plant in West Iceland did indeed suffer Equine Metabolic Syndrome but that the severity of EMS correlated with the amount of fluoride in the bones of the horses.

So horses may also become susceptible to fluoride levels in Reydarfjordur.

Alcoa in Reydarfjordur blame the hot, dry, still weather in East Iceland’s summer for the high fluoride levels, which they also said when high fluoride levels occurred previously, in 2012. It sounds as if Iceland’s typically cool summer weather was one of the reasons for situating the Alcoa aluminium smelter in East Iceland. Have they never heard of global warming, when summers like that in East Iceland in 2021 will become more common? As fluoride accumulates in bone, this may not be good news for farmers near the East Iceland smelter.

It’s as ludicrous as PCC Bakki blaming the winter weather for problems with their silicon metal plant in North Iceland.

Helguvik silicon smelter now valued as “salvage”

The former silicon smelter in Helguvik, southwest Iceland, has been devalued by Arion Bank, the smelter’s largest creditor, so that its book value is now based on the value of the property and resale price of the plant’s equipment.

At a debriefing meeting of the bank, the CEO, Benedikt Gislason is quoted as saying (in Icelandic) that the revised book value was “an indication that there is little hope that the smelter will restart. It would be interesting to see different, greener operations happening there in the future”. One of the reasons that the PCC silicon smelter in north Iceland suspended operations last summer was the bad state of the silicon metal market, so it’s hardly likely that a company would want to bet on spending millions on buying and modifying a plant when the potential market is so fragile.

Nevertheless, the plant is still listed under the bank’s “Assets for Sale”.

The smelter, which was closed down in September 2017 by Iceland’s Environment Agency only nine months after it started operating, is now valued at ISK 1.6 billion kronur (approx. $US 12.5 million). The company operating it, United Silicon, was deemed bankrupt the following January, and Arion Banki set up Stakksberg to deal with the aftermath, including selling the plant. Ahem. I don’t know how long it usually takes to sell a non-functional silicon smelter, but three years seems a long time to me.

Stakksberg obviously realized that it would make more sense to sell the plant in a functional state and set out to remedy the numerous faults listed by the Environment Agency and produced a preliminary environmental impact assessment for the plant. This process is still ongoing, but when it commented on the preliminary EIA the Environment Agency said that overall, the impact of the operation would be considerably negative, while the impact on air quality would likewise be considerably or even substantially negative. The effects on odour pollution, hydrology and appearance would also be considerably negative.

The local council is against the reopening of the smelter, and many locals also sent in comments, mostly about health problems if the plant would start functioning again. I also commented on the preliminary EIA, though I do not live near the site.

A few hundred metres from the disused smelter lies a half-built aluminium smelter. Plans are now afoot to use the site for fish-farming (salmon), albeit by Samherji, Iceland’s largest seafood company and main mover in the Fishrot scandal.

As Gislason said last week, it would be nice to see the old silicon smelter site used for greener operations.

Electricity sources and electric vehicles

A meta-analysis was recently published in the journal Sustainability on the emissions involved in producing battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and the number of kilometres it takes for a BEV to break even with fossil-fuel vehicles (diesel and petrol) in different European countries. Existing studies were reviewed in order to perform the analysis.

The difference is astounding. The key is the source(s) of electricity used in each country for making the batteries.

Although BEVs are simpler in structure and require less maintenance than fossil-fuel vehicles, they have slightly higher emissions than petrol and diesel vehicles in the manufacturing process. The scientists in this study performed life-cycle assessments of the production cycle and estimated the distances of intersection points (DIPs, measured in thousands of km) before a BEV breaks even with fossil fuel cars.

They discovered that BEVs had to be driven for 34,000 km in Iceland before they became more carbon-friendly than diesel cars, but in the UK they had to be driven for 244,000 km before they break even with diesel cars in terms of emissions. Together with Cyprus and Greece (309,000 and 312,700 km respectively), the cars would probably have reached the end of their lifetime before the break-even point is reached. It is assumed that a car’s lifetime is around 183,894 km, as in all the studies they reviewed this was the average distance driven over a vehicle’s physical lifetime.

In some countries (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta) the situation is so bad that “BEVs would never intersect with the compared diesel vehicle at the current electric grid emission intensity due to the use-phase emissions of the BEV being higher than those of the diesel vehicle”. The authors attribute this to the energy mix in the country concerned: for instance, in Poland 80% of the electricity comes from coal. Besides Iceland, the other countries which come well out in this analysis are Norway, France and Sweden.

For petrol cars, the DIP is lower. Iceland still comes best out, with a DIP of 18.9. The figures are lower for all countries, with the same countries coming worst out.

For those who can read Icelandic, Fréttablaðið also reported on this, but to a lesser degree.

It would be interesting to see the same analysis done for hydrogen-fuelled cars and vehicles using methane as fuel. But especially in regard to hydrogen.